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While operational capabilities are used to determine requirements documents for 
combat systems, the acquisition process must take into account costs and schedule when 
providing these systems to the Fleet.  Information technology systems are subsequently 
measured through an analysis of return on investment, utilizing a monetary metric.  This 
analysis of return does not adequately account for the value the system can provide to the 
operator, nor does it account for any additional efficiencies that could be incorporated in 
future designs.  Operational value should not be measured only through cost savings, 
return on investment or financial metrics, but rather the additional capabilities that are 
leveraged through the application of IT.  A tactical operator does not value a system by 
how much it cost, or if it will produce a financial return on investment, but rather whether 
the system can provide a more timely and efficient means to accomplish the mission. 
The purpose of this research is to determine if a knowledge value-added (KVA) 
methodology can measure the operational value of a system, and where deficiencies can 
be identified and processes improved to provide a more robust and capable information 
technology system to the war fighter.  A current initiative known as Navy Open 
Architecture (OA) seeks to leverage commercial technology, non-proprietary standards 
and software reuse to reduce multiple architectures and improve interoperability.  A 
realization of this initiative may provide huge dividends through implementing an 
approach to development of situational awareness systems aboard naval vessels.  Open 
architecture is predominantly associated with providing more capabilities in the design 
and maintenance of information technology systems, and budgetary constraints with 
systems design and development.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Track management is the process by which friendly and enemy forces are 
detected, identified, monitored and updated and communicated throughout the area of 
operations.  This is a fundamental capability that is inherent in all naval ships to some 
extent.   
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Historically, track management was conducted through the use of grease pencils 
and wall charts.  As advances in technology increased, automation through information 
technology became the norm.  With the advent of the AEGIS platform, multiple sensors 
and data links were fused to provide a comprehensive situational awareness of all tracks 
within a given area of responsibility (AOR).  While the AEGIS system, and later SSDS, 
platforms significantly enhanced the track management capabilities of surface ships, they 
were created based on a proprietary architecture which was characterized by stovepipe 
systems that were neither scaleable nor interoperable.  Open architecture provides a 
means to propel the Navy into the next century and an era of joint interoperability. 
In an era where technological development outpaces the current procurement 
process, the United States Navy must implement a strategy that will enable operational 
capabilities to remain at the forefront of naval warfare.  Current legacy systems utilizing 
a closed, proprietary architecture in hardware and software greatly limit operational 
capabilities that could be generated through interoperability and collaborative processes 
that current technology can provide. “Stovepipe” systems built are difficult to upgrade 
and provide limited interoperability with other systems.  As technology continues to 
define requirements for combat effectiveness, the operational forces are required to 
continue to keep up with a multitude of systems that are woefully inadequate in the realm 
of interoperability and functionality.   
The key to United States dominance in any conflict, as discussed by the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Joint Vision 2020, will be “decision superiority.” Decision 
superiority can be defined as “translating information superiority into better decisions 
arrived at and implemented faster than an enemy can react.” To achieve information 
superiority, the Department of Defense has been engaged in the development of a Global 
Information Grid (GIG) which will provide the environment for decision superiority.  As 
the Department of Defense continues to strive for a more joint operational environment, 
the United States Navy will need to develop architectures to meet the integration 
challenges that will be required for integration into the Global Information Grid. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to analyze the AEGIS and SSDS track 
management systems to determine potential operational benefits that could be realized 
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through the application of an OA approach to system design.  Through an application of a 
knowledge value-added methodology, knowledge assets inherent in the core processes of 
a system can be identified, quantified and subsequently valued.     
The methodology provides a return on knowledge or ROK (a ratio which 
measures the knowledge assets resident in a system through its decomposition into the 
common units of output the knowledge asset produces).  This commonality can then be 
used in the assessment of multiple systems within a common domain. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
There are no current measurements or metrics that can effectively provide a 
defensible return on investment estimate at the sub corporate level with regards to a 
system’s operational value.  Current methodologies are applicable to procurement, 
maintenance and lifecycle costs, but are insufficient when determining actual value of a 
system to an operator.   
This research study will provide insight into whether OA can improve operational 
value in a situational awareness system.  Of interest will be whether 1) KVA can be 
applied to estimate the value of the current track management systems on the AEGIS and 
SSDS platforms, 2) the resulting ROK can be used to determine areas where OA may 
provide increased efficiency, and for future research 3) real options analysis can be used 
to support decisions regarding functional integration of current platforms into future 
systems.  These questions will be analyzed using the KVA and Real Options 
methodologies to address these issues.     
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will model the current track management processes found within both 
the AEGIS and SSDS platforms and apply the KVA methodology to them in order to 
determine an “As Is” process performance baseline.  The processes for the current 
systems will be derived from process flow diagrams, use-case diagrams, interviews with 
subject matter experts (SME) and literature review of pertinent documents.  The resulting 
return on knowledge will be analyzed from an operational perspective with respect to a 
“To Be” process generated from an OA design. 
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Both the “As Is” and “To Be” process analysis will be conducted utilizing the 
“learning time” approach to KVA (explained later in this thesis).  The core elements of 
“time-to-learn”, “number of personnel involved”, and “times fired” will produce a ratio 
of the performance of knowledge assets in each process.  This ratio (ROK) provides a 
common unit of measurement to generate the numerator (i.e., value estimate), and is used 
subsequently for each sub process within the track management process. 
F. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the operational value that OA can 
provide to the Fleet with respect to the situational awareness process.  Though greater 
value from open architecture may be in its labor saving and cost saving attributes for 
acquisition and maintenance, this research is focused on the knowledge capital inherent 
in the current systems and how an understanding of this can provide insight into future 
efficiencies based on an OA approach to systems development at the operator level.   
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will be organized in the following manner: 
Chapter I will provide an overview of the thesis with regard to purpose and scope.  
Additionally, research questions and objectives will be provided, along with the 
methodology used to generate the final conclusions.  Chapter II is provided for a 
background understanding of open architecture, how the concept is applied within the 
Navy, and how it may be applied to the research.  This chapter provides the foundation 
for the information needed to complete the research and draw conclusions.  Chapter III 
outlines the KVA methodology so as to provide a basic understanding of the concept of 
knowledge capital and how return on knowledge is derived.  Chapter IV is a detailed 
synopsis of the research conducted, findings and KVA analysis.  This chapter is the crux 
of the thesis and puts the other chapters into operational perspective.  Chapter V presents 
conclusions, real options analysis and any recommendations to the Navy that may be 
derived from the research.  
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II. OPEN ARCHITECTURE ENVIRONMENT 
A. GENERAL 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently addressed the inadequacy 
of legacy systems within the Department of Defense (DOD) with regard to 
interoperability:  “Despite recent progress by the Department of Defense, military 
operations continue to be hampered by command, control, and communications systems 
that lack the ability to interoperate” (GAO-06-211, 2006).   The report further noted that 
“rather than being developed around integrated architectures and common standards, 
systems have been designed and developed using different standards and protocols” 
(GAO-06-211, 2006), which limits their interoperability and ability to exchange 
information horizontally vice vertically.  With the inception of “Sea Power 21”, the Chief 
of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vernon Clark, stated that “…future naval 
operations will use revolutionary information superiority” (Proceedings, 2002).  The idea 
of information superiority was to be achieved through the application of FORCEnet, 
which is “an overarching effort to integrate warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms and weapons into a fully netted, combat force.”  This issue was 
addressed in 2003 by Vice Admirals Richard Mayo and John Nathman in a Proceedings 
article regarding the FORCEnet architecture whereby they commented on  “…standard 
joint protocols, common data packaging, seamless interoperability, and strengthened 
security” (Proceedings, 2003) as requirements for FORCEnet to become an enabler of 
Sea Power 21.  To accomplish these tasks, the Navy must adhere to an open architectural 
framework which will enable effective interoperability and scalability required of the 
Global Information Grid (GIG) and net centric warfare. 
These new visions permeated the U.S. Navy and resulted in the creation of the 
Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) in 2002.  This office 
is charged with implementing the Navy’s Open Architecture (OA) strategy through the 
adoption of standards, products and best practices to ensure that future surface and 
submarine combat systems will allow for integration and future technological insertion.  
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B. DEFINING OPEN ARCHITECTURE 
Open architecture, as defined by the Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) is 
one “that employs open standards for key interfaces within a system”, where open 
standards are ones which “are widely used, consensus based, published and maintained 
by recognized industry standards organizations”, and key interfaces are “common 
boundaries shared between system modules that provides access to critical data, 
information, materiel, or services; and/or are of high interest due to rapid technological 
change, a high rate of failure, or costliness of connected modules” (www. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/osjtf/termsdef.html).  With this concept in mind, the Navy’s 
surface ship community defined OA as “a system architecture and the architectural 
components of a system that conform to open system standards and possess the other 
open systems attributes” (OACE Guidance Document).   
1. OA Attributes 
An open architecture framework should provide principles and guidelines which 
will enable open systems to be designed and evolved over the course of their life cycle.  
To accomplish this, open architecture provides a core group of concepts that must be 
addressed in order to achieve mission requirements.  These concepts, while not all 
encompassing, provide the foundation for the open architecture framework.   
a. Modularity 
One of the underpinnings of an open architecture is the adherence to 
modularity, or modular programming.  This concept is characterized by the 
decomposition of a system into smaller subsystems, or components, which are 
independently operable, subject to change and provide for interaction with each other 
through interfaces.  These components, each with their own set of independent 
characteristics, perform specific functions for the system and, upon completion, return 
control back to the system.  Each of these components can be developed, tested and 
upgraded independently, enabling greater functionality within the entire system.  This 
concept is represented in Figure 1.  Modularity lends itself to software reuse which is also 
considered to be vital in an open architecture environment. 
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Figure 1.   Modular Design Model 
 
b. Reuse 
Segments of code that provide defined functionality (command and 
control, sensor control, track identification etc.) which can be catalogued and reused over 
multiple platforms (AEGIS, SSDS etc.) provide greater flexibility in creation and 
maintenance of application software.  The analogy one might use would be in the 
assembly of an automobile.  The auto (system) needs multiple parts (components) which 
are broken down by functional capabilities (fuel system, brake system, cooling system 
etc.).  When one desires to build the auto, they need only go to the parts store and 
purchase the required parts and assemble them together to create the finished product.  
The same holds true for software reuse:  Libraries of components, or segments of code, 
are created and maintained so that they may be retrieved and used in the creation of new 
systems that require the specific functionality that the components provide.  Generic and 
functionally-specific components can be mixed and matched without undermining the 
overall design of the system, nor impeding the overall functionality of the system.  
Through the partitioning of components along functional boundaries and reuse, systems 
can be designed more efficiently, thereby reducing lifecycle costs and development time.  
Though this attribute seems to be strictly technical, component reuse is determined 
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through business case evaluation, programmatic decisions and technical feasibility, 
ensuring that the operators of a system have input into its development.     
c. Scalability 
Within an OA framework, scalability implies the ability of a system to 
accommodate new functionality and resources without major change or modification.  
The idea of increasing users, workload or amount of transactions without affecting the 
current operation of the system is a large part of an open architecture framework.  
Through adding computing components; upgrading current computing components; or 
providing a technology refresh of current computing components, new functional 
capabilities can be provided without disrupting current capabilities so that continuity of 
work can be achieved.  This concept is imperative to the operational value of a system.   
d. Portability 
Portability speaks to the idea that applications can be easily moved from 
one hardware or software platform to another.  Due to increasing and rapid advances in 
technology, it is imperative that application source code is able to transition between 
multiple operating systems, commercial hardware, networks and middleware.  If an open 
architecture is to be adhered to, applications must have built in capabilities for seamlessly 
switching between a multitude of hardware and software platforms.  Additionally, 
portability can be defined as the ability of the user to transition from one system to 
another similar system with minimal training.  While user portability is not widely 
thought about, it does have implications in the operational context of a system.  Table 1 
provides a listing of possible strategies for implementing portability in an application. 
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Table 1. Application Portability Strategies (OACE Design Guidance 1.0, August 
2004) 
 
2. OA Benefits 
A comparison of open systems and closed or proprietary systems is presented in 
Table 2.   
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Table 2. Open versus Closed systems (The Test and Evaluation Challenges of 
following an Open System Strategy” by Cyrus H. Azani) 
 
An OA approach to systems development can produce a multitude of benefits that 
encompass a wide range of areas, from acquisitions to operations.  A few of these 
benefits are discussed as they pertain to naval combat systems: 
• Lower life cycle cost for weapon systems:  Total cost of ownership will be 
decreased due to increased maintainability, interoperability and 
upgradeability. 
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• Better performing systems:  The ability to rapidly upgrade hardware and 
software with the latest technology enables greater capabilities, 
efficiencies and interoperability. 
• Improved interoperability for joint war fighting:  The concept of software 
reuse and modularity facilitates interoperability between systems that use 
an open architecture framework. 
• Closer cooperation between commercial and military electronics 
industries:  Moving away from proprietary systems, where competition 
becomes obsolete enables a broader range of ideas and technological 
solutions to be presented.  When systems are open, the collaborative 
efforts provide for a more functional and capable system. 
In an operational environment, benefits of open architecture can be manifested in 
a multitude of ways.  Of primary focus is the interoperability of systems.  When systems 
are designed in a proprietary, or closed, manner they are not effectively integrated into 
current systems, nor are upgrades or insertion of new technology easily accomplished.  
Many times additional “middleware” must be used so that interoperability can be 
achieved (middleware, for this purpose, is software that connects two disparate and 
closed systems together through the use of defined interfaces).  When systems use an OA 
approach, the interoperability problem can be rectified.  The outcome for the operator 
could possibly be decreased training time required for the systems; decreased “touch 
time” on processes through automating what was normally a manual process; and 
increased efficiency through seamless integration of multiple systems.  The 
interoperability of multiple applications enables systems to be more robust, which in turn, 
facilitates more capable systems. 
Operators always want more capable and better performing systems.  Using an 
OA approach to system development can make this a reality.  Speaking on the status of 
legacy hardware for naval systems, Captain Thomas Strei, Deputy Director for Open 
Architecture, PEO IWS stated that “current systems are operating at 99% capacity in non-
stressed environments” (Strei, 2003).  Upgrades that would facilitate greater processing 
capacity, increased data sharing capabilities and communication are unable to be 
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performed without completely overhauling the current systems.  With an open 
architecture approach, hardware and software can be modularized, making upgrades more 
efficient and timely.  Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology and equipment is 
maximized to the fullest extent, thereby migrating away from proprietary hardware and 
software to a more robust architecture that takes advantage of commercial advances.  
This idea enables the most current technology to be integrated into the system, facilitating 
faster, more efficient systems at the disposal of the operators. 
3. OA Limitations 
While there are many benefits to the use of an OA approach, there are also some 
limitations that must be addressed.  As risk analysis and mitigation are important factors 
when determining an architectural approach, limitations need to be discussed at the onset 
of any program. 
Of main concern is the number of interfaces that may be brought about by an OA 
approach.  The following is an excerpt from the Committee on the FORCEnet 
Implementation Strategy regarding systems engineering strategies for FORCEnet:  “The 
number of unique interfaces that must be maintained needs to be carefully selected and 
kept to an absolute minimum, or evolution will be hindered by expensive and lengthy 
integration and testing. One way to do this is to require that systems must partition 
common functions in a common way” (Committee on the FORCEnet Implementation 
Strategy, 2005).   Due to the inherent complexity and amount of systems within the Fleet, 
using an OA approach could eventually lead to problems with interface maintenance.  As 
OA takes hold and becomes the standard for architectural design, the amount of 
interfaces will grow and expand to a point that could become unmanageable.  Care must 
be taken to ensure this does not occur.  As pointed out, the partitioning of functions in a 
common way is a mitigation technique, but this requires due diligence throughout the 
Navy, and very detailed requirements development to ensure that component 
functionality is partitioned in a manner that will facilitate reuse across multiple platforms.  
While this poses a technical and managerial limitation to OA, there are other factors that 
may contribute to the inability of an organization to transition to an OA framework. 
While not an inherent technical limitation to open architecture, implementation of 
an OA framework can be troublesome.  Transitioning legacy systems to ones that use an 
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open architecture framework has the potential for huge up-front costs and reoccurring 
maintenance costs.  In order to make the transition, new strategies in both training and 
technology must be developed so that expertise in the new architecture can be achieved. 
Investments in infrastructure upgrades to support the OA and a reevaluation of 
application software will be required, necessitating more costs in the near term.  
Middleware, software that acts as an interface between proprietary, legacy systems and 
OA systems, must be used in the transition, causing additional funding requirements.  
The need to support both the current proprietary systems and the new OA systems can 
become costly in both operational and maintenance environments.  A transition period 
could last as long as 10 years, during which time both architectures must be supported 
and maintained in order to preserve operational capabilities.  As the proprietary systems 
become obsolete, they will require specialized support until they reach the end of their 
lifecycle and are replaced.   
C. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OA TRANSITION 
Realizing that the proprietary, legacy systems that comprise the majority of the 
systems within the Department of the Navy are limited in their processing power; 
difficult to upgrade and expand capabilities; and are not on the same technological level 
as their commercial counterparts, the DON has determined that an OA engineering 
framework is needed in its approach to systems development.  To achieve this transition, 
the PEO IWS, OA Division was created as the responsible organization.  From this 
organization came the Open Architecture Computing Environment (OACE) which is the 
“overall set of resources used in OA systems” (OACE Design Guide 1.0, 2004).  The 
PEO IWS, OA has set about to implement the OACE and has provided a roadmap to 
realize this goal.  
1. OACE Compliance Categories 
The foundation for the OA migration strategy begins with determining 
compliance categories that will be used to identify approaches for systems to operate 




Figure 2.   OACE Compliance Categories (OACE Tech and Stds 1.0, 2004) 
 
Category 1 provides for hardware adapters for non-OACE compatible legacy 
systems.  This is the lowest level approach and would be well suited for applications that 
are near their end of life and will not be maintained, or will not be transitioned into an 
OA framework due to operational requirements.  Category 2 goes a step further and 
implements the concept of middleware.  Legacy applications are isolated from OACE 
compliant systems through the application of OACE compliant middleware.  This is the 
fist category were OACE compliance is addressed.  Category 3 is one of two fully 
compliant categories (the other being Category 4) where OACE standards and interfaces 
are completely adhered to.  Lastly, Category 4 provides all the attributes of Category 3, 
but it also ensures that common functions and services are applied.  The concept of 
common functions and services facilitates reuse of the software across multiple platforms 
and systems, as software components are derived through functional divisions. 
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With a basic understanding of “where we are” a strategy to get to “where we want 
to be” can be generated.   
2. Strategy 
Operational responsibilities necessitate a phased approach to implementing an OA 
framework within the DON.  Figure 3 outlines the phased approach to implementing OA 
with respect to the compliance categories.   
 
Figure 3.   DON OA Strategy (slide presentation by Mike Rice, Deputy PM, OA and Mike 
Russell, Anteon Corp. for E-Gov Conference, 2004) 
 
The transition from each level can be correlated to a phase within the OA 
Transformation Roadmap, presented in Figure 4.  Each movement upwards in the level of 
compliance is directly tied to a schedule and phased transition so that operational 
capabilities are not affected.  With each step the Navy gets closer to the ultimate goal of 
producing systems that “will be fully interoperable with all the systems which they must 





Figure 4.   DON OA Transformation Roadmap (slide presentation by Mike Rice, Deputy 





III. THE KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED METHODOLOGY  
A. MEASURING VALUE WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
(DON)  
One of the greatest hurdles that face the Department of Defense is measuring the 
value associated with its information technology systems and the processes that function 
within, and in conjunction with, these systems.  Webster’s dictionary provides the 
definition of value as, “the monetary or relative worth, utility or importance of 
something,” and seems to fit within the context of those systems that function in non-
revenue generating environments such as the DON.  In the commercial world, value can 
be measured through the revenue generated by an information technology system, or by 
the cost savings that the system may achieve.  However, within the Federal Government 
(specifically the Department of the Navy) and, for that matter, any non-revenue 
generating entity, monetary revenue is not always an easily interpreted measurement of 
value.   
With the introduction of the Information Technology Management Reform Act 
(ITMRA), better known as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, the Federal Government was 
mandated to provide a measurement of performance of their information technology 
systems, and that measure would be determined by “how well the information technology 
supports the programs of the executive agency” (ITMRA).  This was taken further by 
then Secretary of Defense Cohen to define a means of evaluation that will “utilize 
mission outcome based performance measurements as the cornerstone for information 
technology performance assessments” (Appendix K, Annual Defense Report, 1999).  The 
foundation having been laid, the performance metrics, or measurements indicators are left 
to the discretion of the program manager.  
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 requires that an Exhibit 
300 I.C. be submitted to OMB for any major IT initiative acquired after 2005.  Table 3 is 
an example of a possible Exhibit 300 I.C. (example does not include “Baseline”, 
“Planned Improvements to the Baseline” and “Actual Results” as it is only designed to 
illustrate possible measurements).  The four “Measurement Area” entries are mandatory, 
while the “Measurement Category” and “Measurement Indicator” are left to the 
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discretion of the program manager or agency.  Indicators must be tailored to each specific 
system and must provide clearly defined and measurable outputs that are attributable to 
the “Measurement Category” and “Measurement Area”.  Quantitative versus qualitative 
indicators are the preferred measure so that a determination can be made as to how the IT 
initiative will support the strategic goals and objectives of the organization.     
 
Table 3. Example Exhibit 300 I.C. (Performance Reference Model, Vol. II, 2003) 
 
Historically, metrics have been associated with financial returns on investment, 
but as shown in table 3, the measurement indicators for a government IT system need to 
be tied to mission outcome, not the overall input to the system.   
The Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology applies the idea that the 
inherent knowledge in a process is a viable determinant of the process’ value.  Through 
the application of the KVA methodology, knowledge within core processes of an 
organization can be measured and the resulting return on knowledge can be used to 
provide a means of evaluating multiple processes through common units of measurement.  
This methodology does not require that the common units be reflected in the form of 
monetary or financial value.  The processes within the operational context of a CIC can, 
through KVA, all be described in common units of output, the resulting productivity ratio 
(ROK) can then be evaluated to determine where efficiencies may be obtained.  
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B. THE KVA SOLUTION 
1. Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) Theory 
Developed by Dr. Thomas Housel (Naval Postgraduate School) and Dr. Valery 
Kanevsky (Agilent Labs) over 15 years ago, KVA is a means to value the knowledge 
assets within an organization.  Built upon complexity (measure of common unit of 
change) theory, the methodology asserts that core processes within an organization 
process inputs and add value to those inputs, changing the inputs into outputs through 
some application of change, thereby producing an output that has exhibited a 
transformation from the original input.  The theory states that the difference (i.e., change) 
between the inputs from that of the outputs is the value provided by the organization’s 
assets (i.e., people, processes or IT systems) which acted upon the inputs.   In this manner, 
we can see that the knowledge within a process is proportional to the amount of change 
made to an input to produce the output.  This knowledge value, measured in standard 
units of output, facilitates the analysis of multiple, differing processes throughout an 
organization, and empowers management to make more informed decisions concerning 
their core processes.     
Knowledge embedded in core processes of an organization can now be evaluated 
and compared across the entire organization.  KVA produces a common unit of 
knowledge that serves as a surrogate for units of output in a standard way  (Housel and 
Bell, 2001), and in doing so, provides a decision support mechanism for those within the 
organization to make more informed decisions concerning the insertion of information 
technology into the processes.  With a better understanding of where knowledge assets 
reside, a more in depth evaluation of an organization’s processes can be achieved where 
efficiencies can be expanded upon and deficiencies can be rooted out and changed. 
2. KVA Assumptions 
With any methodology or framework there are certain assumptions that must be 
addressed so that a basic understanding can be agreed upon and the level of uncertainty 
can be mitigated.  With KVA, the following assumptions apply:  
1. There must be an input, a process that acts upon the input to produce an 
output. 
20 
2. The type of process (i.e., IT system, employees, procedures etc.) which 
acts upon the input is irrelevant to the measure of change. 
3. Should the input equal the output, then there was no change, nor any value 
added from the process. 
4. Value created by the process is relative to the change that the process 
applies to the input. 
5. Change is measured by the amount of knowledge required to produce the 
change. 
6. Accepting 4 and 5 above, value and knowledge are then related 
7. Knowledge can be defined as the amount of time it takes an average 
learner to acquire the knowledge. 
These assumptions are visually represented in Figure 5, below.  
 




3. KVA Approaches 
The KVA methodology presents a very robust and dynamic framework that can 
use three different approaches for capturing the knowledge inherent in the core processes 
within an organization.  While these approaches vary in application, neither is better or 
worse than the other, they simply present different collection means for deriving a result.  
It is important to note that once an approach is decided upon, it should be applied 
consistently throughout the organization.  Processes cannot be correctly evaluated if they 
use differing approaches to determine their value.  While the learning time approach is 




Table 4. Three Approaches to KVA (Housel and Bell, 2001) 
 
a. Learning Time 
This approach uses a measurement based on the time it would take an 
average person to learn the process in question.  The measurements must be in common 
units of time (i.e., hours, days, weeks etc.) and should be verifiably reliable.  To obtain the 
learning time measurements, all time required to learn the process must be indicated.  
This may include training at a formal school, on-the-job-training (OJT), distance 
education and any other source of training that would be relevant to the generation of an 
output by means of the process indicated.  Generally SME’s, training manuals and 
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standard operating procedures can provide a means for determining the actual learning 
time, although this type of information gathering can be prone to subjectivity.  To avoid 
this and mitigate the risk of obtaining erroneous data, a correlation among two estimates 
can be calculated to ensure the most reliable and accurate data has been provided. 
Correlation can be achieved by obtaining an ordinal ranking based on the 
difficulty to learn each sub process within the organization.  SME’s are asked to rank 
order each sub process in order of difficulty to learn.  This ranking is then correlated 
against the actual learning time data that was provided.  Should the two provide a 
correlation of 80% or greater, the data can be considered to be reliable.  A correlation 
below 80% assumes a discrepancy in either the rank order or the actual amount of 
learning time required for each process.  This can occur when SME’s do not completely 
understand the problem domain and provide learning time estimates that are faulty.  
Restructuring the learning time question or requesting a revalidation will normally be 
required.   
b. Process Description 
This approach measures the number of instructions needed to reproduce 
the outputs produced.  Using the process description approach enables the KVA 
methodology to achieve a higher level of detail in the process description than does the 
learning time approach.  It requires a more detailed and analytical description of each 
process and the amount of instructions needed to produce each output.  The process 
instructions are calibrated in terms of their complexity. 
c. Binary Query 
Utilizing the binary query approach requires the creation of a set of binary 
yes/no questions such that all possible outputs are represented as sequences of yes/no 
answers (i.e., bits).  These sequences can then be calculated and value can be attributed to 
the outcome.   
C. RETURN ON KNOWLEDGE (ROK) 
Return on Knowledge (ROK) is the ratio of revenue allocated to each core area 
compared to its corresponding expenses (Housel and Bell, 2001).  The essence of KVA is 
found in the ROK ratio that the methodology provides.  As stated earlier, knowledge is a 
surrogate for common unit outputs, so ROK provides a means for determining a 
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knowledge value to cost ratio for all processes within an organization.  Proper application 
and analysis of ROK can provide an organization with a better understanding of the 
productivity of its knowledge assets, where they are located and how efficiently they are 
being applied throughout the organization.  For non-revenue generating organizations this 




IV. PROOF OF CONCEPT  
A. INTRODUCTION  
Program Executive Office, Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS), Open 
Architecture Division is charged with implementing the Navy’s OA plans, policies and 
initiatives.  One of these initiatives is the implementation of an open architecture 
approach to developing a situational awareness (SA) system for the DD(X) project.  To 
accomplish this, PEO IWS has looked at both the AEGIS and SSDS platforms to 
determine specific elements of each track management system that could possibly be 
reengineered using open architecture approach for placement into the new DD(X) 
program.  In doing this, metrics must be looked at to determine the best modules that 
could be candidates for open architecture.   
This proof of concept will take information from subject matter experts from both 
the Surface Warfare Fleet and from training commands at Dahlgren (AEGIS) and 
Wallops Island (SSDS).  The process information garnered from these SME’s will then 
be aggregated to provide an average for each process (multiple sources provide multiple 
figures, so an average will be calculated to ensure a more accurate result is achieved) 
using the KVA methodology.  This analysis is the “As Is” baseline.  The resulting ROK’s 
will then by analyzed to determine if information technology, specifically with relation to 
systems built using an open architecture approach, could be inserted to enhance the 
operational capabilities of a Combat Information Center (CIC) aboard a naval vessel.  
Lastly, a Real Options analysis can be conducted on possible ROK values generated from 
the “To Be” model of the SA system, thereby providing PEO IWS with an idea of 
specific processes within the SA system that could be reengineered with an open 
architecture approach to provide the greatest value to the operational fleet.   
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Measures of effectiveness (MOE) for open architecture in an operational 
environment can be derived through the application of the Knowledge Value Added 
Methodology.  These MOE metrics can then be used to support decisions for acquisition, 
procurement, development and integration of software components by generating a return 
on knowledge for each core process within the situational awareness arena. 
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C. ANALYSIS AND DATA COLLECTION 
1. Track Management in the Combat Information Center (CIC)  
Each platform (AEGIS and SSDS), and for that matter, each ship, has different 
procedures and policies regarding the situational awareness or track management 
functions within the CIC.  While these functions may vary, the cores of the processes that 
make up the system are basically the same and have been validated by both Fleet 
personnel and personnel at the formal schools.  The current track management process 
has a mixture of automation and manual processes involved, and while there are 
variances as to the amount of each, an aggregated amount will be used so that an average 
output can be assumed for estimation purposes.   
Track management within a CIC is a complex process, involving multiple sub 
processes and multiple individuals.  Outputs from one sub process may, or may not, have 
a bearing on another sub process within the overall situational awareness process.  This 
ability of each sub process to possibly be a stand-alone process or be integrated into the 
bigger SA system provides for a robust and highly capable system, but also makes an 
analysis of the system very complicated and challenging. 
2. Data Collection Challenge 
Due to the complex nature of the track management system in the CIC, collecting 
appropriate data that can be analyzed through the KVA methodology was challenging.  
Outputs, learning time and touch time of many sub processes that make up the entire 
system are not generally collected or retained.  Within the Navy, training times and 
required on-the-job-training (OJT) are targeted at specific watch stations rather than 
specific processes, which is what KVA requires.  Due to this, data derived for the purpose 
of this analysis was extracted through conversations with SME’s and reviewing of 
Personal Qualification Standards (PQS).  Multiple SME’s were contacted so that an 
aggregated sample could be achieved.   
D. DEFINING THE TRACK MANAGEMNT PROCESS 
1. CIC Overview 
With respect to this thesis, the following watch stations were identified as having 
a direct impact on the track management process within a CIC.  These watch stations, 
while sometimes being associated with different names, were consistent on both AEGIS 
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and SSDS platforms.  Additionally, though the watch stations have specific tasks and 
responsibilities, in an actual CIC all personnel listed can be actively involved in any, or 
all, aspects of track management (correlation, identification, tracking, and relaying).  
While there will be variances from ship to ship; Figure 6 is a generalized organizational 
chart of the personnel within a CIC that are actively involved with track management. 
 
Figure 6.   CIC Organizational Chart 
 
2. CIC Watch Stander Descriptions 
a. Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 
The Tactical Action Officer has overall responsibility for actions within 
the CIC.  The TAO leads the CIC watch team and coordinates the track management 
functions within the CIC.  As the senior watch station within the CIC, the TAO is 
responsible for most track management decisions made within the CIC.  The TAO watch 
station is predominantly filled by a field grade officer.  Additional duties that may be 





b. Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC) 
The Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator is responsible for the overall air picture 
within the CIC.  A majority of the time, the AAWC will be the second senior officer in 
the CIC.  The AAWC directs a team of operators in the detection, identification and 
dissemination of aircraft tracks within the ship’s airspace.  The AAWC will control 
movement of friendly aircraft assigned to the ship, attend intelligence briefings and 
maintain a general awareness of the air picture during all phases of CIC operations.  
While charged with the overall status of the air picture, the AAWC will delegate many of 
the specific track management tasks to subordinates so as to keep track of the overall air 
picture.  The AAWC watch station is predominantly filled by a junior officer.  Additional 
duties that may be accomplished by the AAWC outside of the track management domain 
are not applicable to this thesis. 
c. Surface Warfare Coordinator (SUWC) 
The Surface Warfare Coordinator is responsible for the overall surface 
picture within the CIC.  The SUWC directs a team of operators in the detection, 
identification and dissemination of surface tracks within the ship’s airspace.  The SUWC 
will attend intelligence briefings and maintain a general awareness of the surface picture 
during all phases of CIC operations.  While charged with the overall status of the surface 
picture, the SUWC will delegate many of the specific track management tasks to 
subordinates so as to keep track of the overall surface picture.  The SUWC watch station 
is predominantly filled by a junior officer.  The Additional duties that may be 
accomplished by the SUWC outside of the track management domain are not applicable 
to this thesis. 
d. Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC) 
Usually the senior ranking enlisted in the CIC, the Combat Systems 
Coordinator is charged with monitoring and initiating troubleshooting procedures for 
communications systems, Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) Links and the 
Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) system.  The CSC is directly responsible for identification 
processes within the CIC, to include AEGIS ID doctrine and track management operator 
performance.  The CSC provides support to all operators within the CIC in the  
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management of air and surface tracking, identifying and relaying.  Additional duties that 
may be accomplished by the CSC outside of the track management domain are not 
applicable to this thesis. 
e. Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC) 
The Tactical Information Coordinator operates and maintains the TADIL 
A (Link 11) and TADIL J (Link 16) between friendly air and surface craft within the area 
of operations.  The inherent importance of the Link picture, the TIC is primarily focused 
on ensuring a clear, coherent picture is presented over the Links.  The TIC is responsible 
for identifying and quickly resolving any correlation issues (“same contact, multiple 
tracks”).  The TIC watch station is predominantly filled by a junior enlisted.  Additional 
duties that may be accomplished by the TIC outside of the track management domain are 
not applicable to this thesis. 
f. Identification Supervisor (IDS) 
The Identification Supervisor is charged with the overall identification 
process within the CIC.  The IDS will be responsible for IFF challenges, query and/or 
warning procedures directed at suspect contacts and inputting of information into the CIC 
track database (AEGIS Command and Display system).  The IDS will monitor all tracks 
and ensure timely and accurate identification can be generated so that decisions can be 
made as to the intent of the contact.  The IDS is primarily focused on the air picture (due 
to the immanent danger of air contacts with relation to surface contacts), but does support 
the surface picture as well.  The IDS watch station is predominantly filled by a junior 
enlisted.  Additional duties that may be accomplished by the IDS outside of the track 
management domain are not applicable to this thesis. 
3. Defined Track Management Sub Processes 
The process of track management within a CIC is a very complex and 
sophisticated process involving multiple watch stations and technological systems. In 
order to analyze the process with the KVA methodology it was necessary to decompose 
the track management process into individual sub processes.  This decomposition enables 
a more diverse analysis of each functional area within the track management process.  
The core processes that make up track management are provided below in Figure 7.  
These core sub processes were derived from correspondence with multiple Subject 
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Matter Experts in both the AEGIS and SSDS communities.  While each of the sub 
processes may differ from ship to ship, the SME’s concluded that these 4 sub processes 
reflected the procedures that are conducted within a CIC for track management.  These 
sub processes were further decomposed in order to evaluate the specific functions 
associated with each.  Again, SME’s were consulted and the basic understanding was that 
the 17 functional areas were at a sufficient level of decomposition for this thesis.  While 
the SME’s said there is no definitive sequential order in which the steps take place, the 
figure provides a possible sequence that could occur so as to provide a visual 
representation for the reader. 
 
Figure 7.   Track Management Sub Processes 
 
Each of these sub processes and associated functions are conducted throughout 
the track management process.  While some of the sub processes are not always 
conducted, the listing provides an aggregated decomposition that can be generalized for 
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both the AEGIS and SSDS platforms, and each associated ship within those platforms.  
Each sub process is further defined below so that each can be understood in the context of 
this thesis. 
a. Correlate 
For the purpose of this thesis, correlate will be defined as the ability to 
combine target detections from individual radars, identification friend or foe (IFF) system 
and any additional electronic support measures systems that may be available to obtain a 
single, composite track that can be used to enhance the common operational picture 
within the CIC.  This sub process is further broken into more specific functions below. 
1. OBTAIN LINK INFORMATION:  Tactical Digital 
Information Link (TADIL) Links A and J are the primary means by which elements 
within a battle group can exchange information about their individual air and surface 
pictures.  The data passed provides each element with an updated common operational 
picture so as to maintain a real-time situational awareness of the battle force area of 
operations.  TADIL A, commonly referred to as Link 11, is the older of the two, and is 
found on all platforms.  TADIL A requires a Net Control Station (NCS) to manage the 
network and facilitate controlled communications where elements will transmit data to 
the NCS, and only once all elements have relayed their data will the NCS provide a 
consolidated picture to the entire battle force.  TADIL J, commonly referred to as Link 
16, is the newer system and provides for higher data transfer rates, resistance to jamming 
and the ability for multiple elements to transmit data simultaneously, without the use of a 
NCS.  Some elements within the Fleet still do not possess the Link 16 capability.  The 
process of obtaining, understanding, managing and utilizing the information from the 
Links is the crux of this sub process.  A diagram of the TADIL J/Link 16 architecture is 

















Figure 8.   Link 16 architecture 
 
2. IDENTIFY “SAME CONTACT, MULTIPLE TRACKS”:  
Many times the AEGIS and SSDS platforms will identify the same contact with multiple 
tracks on the operator consoles.  This anomaly must be corrected so that the operational 
picture can be clearly portrayed to the battle force.  The process of identifying when there 
are multiple tracks for the same contact, and then correcting this error so that a single 
track is promulgated to the Fleet.  This is currently a manual process that requires the 
operator to understand the anomaly and have the requisite knowledge to identify when it 
is occurring and the ability to correct the duplication. 
3. VERIFY OTHER SOURCES FOR TRACK:  Operators 
must be able to validate any and all sources for a given track.  This will sometimes 
require verbal communications with adjacent elements in the battle force, querying 
system resources and understanding the multiple sensor nodes that are available at any 
given time and area of operations.  Should a track come from a non organic asset of the 
ship, the operator must be able to contact the remote source and confirm the information 
that was provided for the given track. 
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b. Track 
Track is the process by which a detected track is monitored and managed.  
This involves both operator and system functions and procedures.  Visually monitoring a 
track and updating its status into multiple systems, as required, fall into the purview of 
this process.   
1. MONITOR SUSPECT TRACKS:  Once a track has been 
detected it has the ability to be monitored.  Suspect tracks are those that have not been 
identified or have been identified as “hostile” or “unknown”.  These tracks pose a 
possible threat to the Fleet and must be monitored until they are identified as “friendly” 
or have been determined by competent authority as not to be of significant threat to the 
Fleet.  This is still a highly manual process, although both systems can be programmed to 
monitor these tracks more closely. 
2. UPDATE TRACK:  Once a track has been detected and is 
in the process of being monitored, it may routinely need to be updated, both in the ship’s 
organic systems and in any other systems that may require track integration.  An update 
to a current track can consist of any myriad of information that is applicable to the track 
and can be performed at any time.  An update is currently a manual process whereby an 
operator inputs information into the system as it becomes available.  While updates can 
be performed by any operator, there is normally one individual assigned so as to provide 
continuity and coordination of effort.   
3. UPDATE GLOBAL COMMAND AND CONTROL 
SYSTEM – MARITIME (GCCS-M):  The Global Command and Control System 
enhances the operational commander’s war fighting capability and aids in the decision-
making process by receiving, retrieving, and displaying information relative to the 
current tactical situation. GCCS-M receives, processes, displays, and manages data on the 
readiness of neutral, friendly, and hostile forces in order to execute the full range of Navy 
missions (e.g., strategic deterrence, sea control, power projection, etc.) in near-real-time 
via external communication channels, local area networks (LANs) and direct interfaces 
with other systems (www.fas.org). The GCCS-M is updated both manually and 
automatically.  The system uses Link 11 for connectivity, but has the ability to use Link 
16 in certain instances.  Tracks are automatically populated in GCCS-M via Link 11, but 
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deletions from the system require manual intervention.  Due to the fact that this is a 
planning tool which provides non-real time track data, there is little emphasis within a 
CIC to update and monitor GCCS-M.  A problem exists when staff planners, usually at 
the flag officer level, rely on inaccurate track data that has not been monitored, and 
subsequently updated, by operators within the CIC. 
c. Identification 
The identification sub process provides the greatest decomposition of the 
track management process.  This sub process involves a multitude of functions that 
encompass the identification of detected tracks.  The processes involved in identification 
are both manual and technology driven, and are the crux of the track management 
process.  The ability to correctly identify a track in a timely and efficient manner is, quite 
possibly, the most important aspect within the track management process, which is why it 
was given so much attention. 
1. VERIFY IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OR FOE (IFF) 
SIGNAL:  The Identification Friend or Foe system is used for providing quick and 
accurate recognition of friendly aircraft and ships.  Each friendly military aircraft/ship 
has a specific IFF code associated with it.  Additionally, certain IFF codes are used by 
commercial aircraft internationally to provide a means of identification in support of the 
air traffic control tower missions.  The unique codes and their functions are detailed 
below in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Identification Friend or Foe Categories 
 
IFF interrogation is almost completely automated.  The system interrogates the contact 
through electronic signals, which the contact will provide an appropriate response, 
depending on which IFF mode it is utilizing.  Operators only need to monitor this process 
and correct any anomaly’s they may see.   
2. VERIFY ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) EMISSIONS:  
Each aircraft type gives off an electronic signature that is specific to the type of aircraft.  
This signature can be collected and interpreted against known signatures.  This process is 
substantially automated in the collection of information, but due to its processor 
requirements, the notification is not automatic as it would crash the current system.  The 
procedure is for the cryptographic technician to verbally send a report to the CIC 
outlining the information gained from the emissions of the aircraft. 
3. VERIFY POINT OF ORIGIN:  Manual in nature, this is 
the process whereby an operator will try to determine the point of origin of a contact.  
This involves knowledge of the contacts kinematics information and verification of 
additional system resources (IFF, EW, Air Tasking Order etc.).   
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4. MATCH AGAINST AIR TASKING ORDER (ATO):  The 
ATO is distributed on a daily basis via GCCS-M.  A hard-copy printout will be provided 
to CIC personnel, which will be used to determine if a contact, based on time, kinematics, 
IFF and EW data could be a friendly aircraft depicted in the daily ATO.  This is a 
currently a completely manual process. 
5. MATCH AGAINST COMMERCIAL AIR (CommAir) 
PROFILE:  Commercial air traffic use specific lanes and corridors in their flight patterns.  
These lanes and corridors are circulated and well known.  Additionally, commercial 
aircraft have flight profiles (speed, altitude, emissions etc.) that are specific to the civil 
and commercial industry.  The process of matching specific kinematics, IFF and EW 
information to that of known commercial profiles can be done almost completely through 
automation, with minimal monitoring for questionable contacts that may not trip a 
CommAir profile doctrine.   
 6. MATCH AGAINST INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION:  
Intelligence briefs are provided on a daily basis.  These briefs provide the most current 
information as to the operational situation, friendly and enemy forces disposition and any 
additional updates as may be relevant to the Fleet.  At a minimum, the TAO, AAWC and 
SUWC will attend these briefs.  The process of applying the intelligence provided at the 
daily briefs in an attempt to identify a contact is completely manual.     
7. EXAMINE KINEMATICS DATA:  Kinematics data are 
attributes specific to a given contact.  They may include, but are not limited to, bearing, 
speed and altitude.  This information is provided by the system, but the operator must 
understand it in context and make decisions based on the information provided and 
known criteria.  This process can be automated through ID doctrine, but more often than 
not, it is conducted by an operator. 
8. OBTAIN VISUAL IDENTIFICATION:  When available, 
either a friendly aircraft or a lookout on the deck can provide a visual identification of a 
contact.  This process is conducted by an operator in the CIC verbally requesting one of 
the aforementioned elements to conduct a visual scan of the contact, if possible. 
9. CONDUCT VERBAL QUERY:  A completely manual 
process whereby an operator in the CIC, following the procedures of the ship, will 
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attempt to contact the unknown track via radio communications.  The first attempt will 
most often be through an encrypted path, but if that fails, an unencrypted channel will be 
used to gain voice communications.  Due to the fact that commercial aircraft do not have 
access to encryption, this process sequence can be altered (unencrypted radio 
communications before encrypted radio communications) should the operator believe the 
contact is a commercial aircraft versus a friendly military aircraft. 
d. Relay 
Once a contact has been identified, it is usually disseminated throughout 
the battle force.  This process is conducted in a controlled manner so as not to publish 
erroneous track information and muddle the operational picture and situational awareness 
of the battle force. 
1. SEND OVER THE LINKS:  Once a contact has been 
identified, the process of providing the information via Link 11 or Link 16 is conducted.  
The operator will determine if enough information is provided for the contact to be given 
a “friendly” or “hostile” identity.  If not enough information is provided, the operator 
may determine to send the contact out as an “unknown” and request additional support in 
identification from other sources within the battle group.   
2. DISCUSS PICTURE WITH BATTLE FORCE UNITS:  
The entire track management process, as presented so far, is not sufficient to provide a 
completely accurate situational awareness of the operational picture.  Different platforms 
have differing assets at their disposal or allied vessels may not possess the capability to 
tie into the network, so it is beneficial to conduct periodic discussions with the force 
elements to ensure a common operational picture is obtained.  This is a manual process 
whereby an operator verbally communicates with other elements within the battle force. 
E. “AS IS” KVA ANALYSIS 
An analysis of each watch station within the track management process and the 
associated sub processes is provided for both the AEGIS and SSDS platforms in the 
following tables.  The information provided for each analysis was produced through 
discussions, video teleconferences and phone conversations with SME’s.  Each category 
for the KVA analysis is defined below. 
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1. Number of Personnel 
The “Number of Personnel” category represents the number of sailors and officers 
which are involved in the specific sub process.  For purposes of this research, the column 
will reflect (1) due to the fact that each individual watch station is delineated and 
provided its own individual analysis.  Were processes not broken down by watch stations, 
the number for this column would reflect the total amount of sailors and officers required 
to complete the given process. 
2. Actions per Hour 
The “Actions per Hour” reflects the number of times each sub process is executed 
by the specified watch stander.  The actions are predicated on the amount of contacts, 
both air and surface, which are encountered during a typical hour within the CIC.  Each 
contact must be acted upon, hence the rationale for “actions” versus “contacts” per hour.  
The values were obtained through querying subject matter experts, from both training and 
operational commands, as to what their experience has been with each sub process.  Each 
SME provided an estimate, and these estimates were then aggregated to determine the 
average amount of actions per hour.  Basic assumptions for this category were: 
• Estimates were to be determined based on a typical, six month deployment 
• The number of contacts were determined based on an average of both 
open ocean transit and operations in the littorals 
3. Actual Work Time (AWT)  
Each time a sub process is acted upon (as depicted in the “Actions per Hour” 
category) there is a specific amount of time that is required to accomplish the action.  The 
“AWT” category captures this data in hourly units.  While each of the actions only 
requires a few seconds, the category captures the data in hours in order to maintain 
continuity of units of time throughout the analysis.     
4. Total Work Time  
Each of the sub processes are acted upon multiple times during a given hour of 
operations.  The “Total Work Time” category represents the total amount of time that 
each individual sub process is acted upon within an hour.  This category is derived by 
multiplying the “AWT” and “Actions per Hour” categories together.  The analysis is 
given in hourly units, so when “Total Work Time” for each of the sub processes are 
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added together for each of the watch stations, the total aggregate should remain below 
1.0.  If the total was to exceed 1.0, we would know our calculations, or estimates, are 
incorrect as there is only 1.0 hours for all the given sub processes to occur.  Given this, if 
the total was to equal 1.0, it would mean that for any given hour, 100% of the watch 
station’s time is devoted to the sub processes depicted in the analysis. 
5. Actual Learning Time (ALT) 
The “Actual Learning Time” category is the focal point of the analysis.  It 
provides the total amount of time that is required to learn the given sub process.  
Learning time can be an aggregate of formal schools, distance learning, OJT or any other 
training experience that could fall within the local command definition of “learning”.  For 
the purposes of this analysis, ALT is comprised of formal school training and OJT 
provided aboard ship.  To ensure that all estimates from SME’s were consistent, a 
standard baseline needed to be provided.  The basic assumptions to achieve this baseline 
are provided below: 
a. Officer-SSDS 
The baseline for each officer was an individual that had completed initial 
officer training, but had no prior experience with the SSDS platform.  Additionally, it 
was necessary to determine the formal schools that would be represented by this 
category.  While each school’s duration is considerably longer than the hours represented 
in the “ALT” category, estimates were determined based on the aggregated amount of 
time that was devoted to teaching the given sub process from each school: 
• SSDS Basic Operator Course of Instruction  
• SSDS Advanced Operator Course of Instruction 
• SSDS Warfare Operator Course of Instruction 
b. Officer-AEGIS 
The baseline for each officer was an individual that had completed officer 
training, but had no prior experience with the AEGIS platform.  Additionally, it was 
necessary to determine the formal schools that would be represented by this category.  
While each school’s duration is considerably longer than the hours represented in the 
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“ALT” category, estimates were determined based on the aggregated amount of time that 
was devoted to teaching the given sub process from each school: 
• AEGIS Training Course 
• SWOS TAO School 
• TAO Simulator Training 
c. Enlisted-SSDS 
The baseline for each sailor was an individual that had completed boot 
camp, but had no prior experience with the SSDS platform.  Additionally, it was 
necessary to determine the formal schools that would be represented by this category.  
While each school’s duration is considerably longer than the hours represented in the 
“ALT” category, estimates were determined based on the aggregated amount of time that 
was devoted to teaching the given sub process from each school: 
• OS “A” School 
• SSDS Basic Operator Course of Instruction  
• SSDS Advanced Operator Course of Instruction 
• SSDS Warfare Operator Course of Instruction (E5 and above) 
d. Enlisted-AEGIS 
The baseline for each sailor was an individual that had completed boot 
camp, but had no prior experience with the AEGIS platform.  Additionally, it was 
necessary to determine the formal schools that would be represented by this category.  
While each school’s duration is considerably longer than the hours represented in the 
“ALT” category, estimates were determined based on the aggregated amount of time that 
was devoted to teaching the given sub process from each school: 
• OS “A” School 




6. Rank Order (NLT) 
An ordinal ranking of the sub processes provides a means to ensure the “ALT” 
estimates are reliable and as accurate as possible.  By allowing the SME’s to rank order 
each of the sub processes (1 being the least complex) outside the context of units of time, 
a mathematical correlation can be calculated between the “Rank Order (NLT)” and 
“ALT” categories.  If a correlation of .80 or higher is achieved, the “ALT” numbers can 
be considered an accurate reflection of the sub processes complexity.  Should the 
correlation result in a number below .80, “ALT” estimates should be closely scrutinized 
and possibly reevaluated after providing a better explanation of the “ALT” components to 
the SME’s.  It is possible to achieve a 100% correlation between rank ordered ordinal 
numbers and ration numbers (ALT) due to the mathematical properties of the two scales. 
7. Percent Information Technology (%IT) 
Each sub process is represented by a percentage between 0 and 100.  This number 
is an estimate for the percentage of automation for each sub process.  This category 
captures the knowledge that is embedded within the IT so that it can be accounted for in 
calculations in a way that is consistent with the human learning time estimates.  
Automation is defined as the amount of the sub process that is performed by information 
technology systems, and does not require the actions of an operator.  If the category has 
100%, this would indicate that the sub process is completely automated and does not 
require a watch stander to accomplish any portion of the task.  If the category is 0%, there 
is no automation and the watch stander completes the entire sub process manually.  
Numbers that fall between the extremes are estimates based on SME observations and 
experience. 
8. Total Learning Time (TLT) 
This category is determined by dividing the “Actual Learning Time” by the 
“Percent Information Technology” category.  The actual formula is ALT/(1-%IT).  This 
calculation provides a total time required to learn the sub process, to include that learning 
time which is resident within the IT system.  For instance:  If it takes 2 hours to learn a 
system that is 50% automated, then the total learning time for that system (to include the 




The “Numerator” category describes the “percentage of the revenue or sales 
dollar allocated to the amount of knowledge required to obtain the outputs of a given 
process in proportion to the total amount of knowledge required to generate the 
corporation's salable outputs” (Housel and Bell, 2001).  The revenue surrogate allocated 
to the amount of knowledge, for purposes of this research, is the amount of knowledge 
that is resident in the sub process.  To calculate this category, the “Number of Personnel”, 
“Actions per Hour”, and “Total Learning Time” categories are multiplied together, 
providing the knowledge revenue surrogate for each sub process.    
10. Denominator 
This category denotes the cost associated with producing the output of the sub 
process.  It is determined through multiplying the “Number of Personnel”, “Actions per 
Hour” and “Actual Work Time” categories.  This calculation provides the cost associated 
with the sub process. 
11. Return on Knowledge (ROK) 
With every sub process, there is a cost and value (or revenue) associated with 
generating an output.  While these values and costs are captured in the “Numerator” and 
“Denominator” categories there needs to be a way to quantify the knowledge embedded 
within an IT system.  ROK is the ratio between the “Numerator” and “Denominator” 
categories which is used to determine the value added by knowledge assets within a given 
process.  The ratio provides a representation as to how well the knowledge assets in an 
organization are performing based upon the value and cost that each provides.  ROK’s 
can be compared within a process to help determine if knowledge assets are being used in 
an efficient manner; if automation could be inserted to improve process performance; and 
if processes should be changed to promote efficiencies.  While ROK is a valuable tool, a 
low ROK does not automatically assume a process is inefficient or in need of automation, 
but rather is an indicator that the process may need further analysis to determine if it is 
using its knowledge assets in a productive manner.    
12. “As Is” Process Data 
Each of the processes, and subsequent sub processes, associated with the different 
watch stations will be presented for evaluation.  The methodology of decomposing the 
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track management process based upon each watch station provides a more 
comprehensive look at the value associated with each watch station for each platform 
(AEGIS, SSDS).  
Each of the following analyses presents aggregated data as provided by SME’s.  
The resulting ROK’s were used to focus attention to discrepancies and differences 
between the processes.  Through an analysis of the “As Is” data, a better understanding 
was gained as to use of knowledge assets within in each process.   
a. AEGIS Tactical Action Officer Analysis 
Table 6 depicts the track management core processes involved in the KVA 
analysis for a TAO aboard an AEGIS platform.   
 
Table 6. “As Is” AEGIS TAO KVA Analysis 
 
b. SSDS Tactical Action Officer Analysis 
Table 7 depicts the track management core processes involved in the KVA 
analysis for a TAO aboard an SSDS platform. 
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Table 7. “As Is” SSDS TAO KVA Analysis 
 
c. AEGIS Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator Analysis 
Table 8 depicts the track management core processes involved in the KVA 
analysis for an AAWC aboard an AEGIS platform. 
 
Table 8. “As Is” AEGIS AAWC KVA Analysis 
 
d. SSDS Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator Analysis 
Table 9 depicts the track management core processes involved in the KVA 
analysis for an AAWC aboard an SSDS platform. 
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Table 9. “As Is” SSDS AAWC KVA Analysis 
 
e. AEGIS Surface Warfare Coordinator 
Table 10 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for an SUWC aboard an AEGIS platform. 
 
Table 10. “As Is” AEGIS SUWC KVA Analysis 
 
f. SSDS Surface Warfare Coordinator 
Table 11 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for an SUWC aboard an SSDS platform. 
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Table 11. “As Is” SSDS SUWC KVA Analysis 
 
g. AEGIS Combat Systems Coordinator 
Table 12 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for a CSC aboard an AEGIS platform. 
 
Table 12. “As Is” AEGIS CSC KVA Analysis 
 
h. SSDS Combat Systems Coordinator 
Table 13 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for a CSC aboard an SSDS platform. 
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Table 13. “As Is” SSDS CSC KVA Analysis 
 
i. AEGIS Tactical Information Coordinator 
Table 14 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for a TIC aboard an AEGIS platform. 
 
Table 14. “As Is” AEGIS TIC KVA Analysis 
 
j. SSDS Tactical Information Coordinator 
Table 15 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for a TIC aboard an SSDS platform. 
48 
 
Table 15. “As Is” SSDS TIC KVA Analysis 
 
k. AEGIS Identification Supervisor 
Table 16 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for an IDS aboard an AEGIS platform. 
 
Table 16. “As Is” AEGIS IDS KVA Analysis 
 
l. SSDS Identification Supervisor 
Table 17 depicts the track management core processes involved in the 
KVA analysis for an IDS aboard an SSDS platform. 
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Table 17. “As Is” SSDS IDS KVA Analysis 
 
F. “TO BE” KVA ANALYSIS 
The “To Be” analysis is a notional representation of the possible effects given a 
futuristic scenario that incorporates changes to the sub processes.  For the purposes of 
this analysis, sub processes that could possibly be affected through the use of an open 
architectural framework have been adjusted to reflect the changes.  Only those processes 
that could be affected will be provided in this section.  Sub processes that would not be 
affected through the application of an open architecture are not presented in this section, 
and should be considered to remain unchanged. 
1. Open Architecture Reengineering 
Through an analysis of the “As Is” processes, it was determined that the optimal 
enhancements to an operational environment could be achieved in the areas of systems 
integration and hardware scalability through the application of open architecture.  The 
analysis was focused through the ROK results, but was not limited to only using ROK as 
a determining factor.  The ROK results led to more pointed questions: 
• Why were the “Obtain Link Information” and “Verify IFF Signal” 
ROK’s orders of magnitude greater than the other processes? 
• Why was there a difference in some process ROK’s between watch 
stations across the platforms? 
• Should all watch stations be trained for each of the sub processes? 
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Taking this idea and reengineering the processes involving these areas provided 
increases in the ROK for each sub process.  For the purposes of this research, the effect 
of training time through open architecture could not be determined, so the category was 
left unchanged.  Assumptions for the reengineering methodology were:  1) integration 
through the use of middleware was necessary until Category 3 OACE level could be 
reached for systems being evaluated and 2) hardware would be Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf (COTS) equipment. 
2. “To Be” Process Data 
In presenting the following scenarios it was necessary to estimate the changes in 
“AWT” and “%IT” categories due to the fact that the “To Be” analysis is an estimation.  
For all scenarios it was assumed that a transformation to open architecture would 
automate a sub process to the extent that the “%IT” category would be 95%.  Automation 
in these sub processes would result in a decrease in “AWT” as it would no longer be 
necessary for a watch stander to be involved in the conduct of the sub process, so the time 
needed to complete the action would be reduced.   
The sub processes affected were “Update GCCS-M”, “Verify EW Emissions”, 
“Verify Point of Origin” and “Match against ATO”.  Each of the watch stations was 
affected, though some more than others as not all sub processes were applicable to all 
watch stations.  Tables 19 through 30 represent the analysis of each watch station after a 
notional reengineering of the sub processes occurs. 
The “Update GCCS-M” sub process could be affected through an application of a 
middle ware product until the AEGIS and SSDS platforms could reach a Category 3 
OACE level.  The current version of GCCS-M provides an “open-system commercial and 
government standards-based architecture that maximizes use of non-developmental items 
and is in compliance with the Global Information Grid-Enterprise Services to ensure 
interoperability with U.S. Joint and other naval C4I systems” (Globalsecurity.org).  Due 
to its use of OA it was determined to be a candidate for incorporation into an AEGIS or 
SSDS platform that conformed to open architecture standards.  While some critical 
interfaces have yet to be tested, it would be a means to enhance the operational value of 
the systems through a reduction in time, manpower and possible training required to 
conduct the process. 
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“Verify EW Emissions” is hindered through hardware limitations due to the 
proprietary nature of the equipment.  Applying an open architecture framework to the 
EW systems would facilitate a COTS based environment that could easily be upgraded to 
accommodate greater processor speeds.  The ability to communicate the data from the 
EW systems electronically to the CIC personnel that require it would greatly enhance the 
efficiency of the CIC through more timely situational awareness.  Operators would be 
freed up to conduct other tasks that they would otherwise not have time to accomplish. 
“Verify Point of Origin” sub process could be enhanced through better integration 
of sensors within the AEGIS and SSDS platforms.  An open architecture framework 
could enable greater sensor and data integration which would provide more enhanced 
correlation to pinpoint the point of origin of an aircraft or ship.  Point of origin for 
friendly force contacts could be queried from an open GCCS-M system and ATO, while 
neutral force contacts could be interrogated from host nation airports, assuming data 
formats were standardized and provided by host nations.  Presenting an open architecture 
framework to the AEGIS and SSDS platforms could facilitate interfaces to these other 
systems in order to provide an automated query for point of origin.  The automation of 
this sub process would free up watch standers to accomplish other tasks, while at the 
same time providing quicker data flow. 
Lastly, the sub process “Match Against ATO” could be greatly enhanced through 
an open architecture framework.  Current initiatives are being looked into for feasibility 
of integrating the ATO into surface combat ships though an automatic parsing and 
feeding of messages into ID engines on AEGIS and SSDS platforms.  Using LINK 11 or 
LINK 16, data could be fed into the systems.  Through an application of middleware and 
COTS hardware, the information provided in the ATO could be integrated into the 
AEGIS and SSDS platforms, greatly reducing the manpower required to accomplish this 
sub process.     
a. AEGIS Tactical Action Officer Analysis 
Table 18 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for a TAO aboard an AEGIS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach.  
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Table 18. “To Be” AEGIS TAO KVA Analysis 
 
b. SSDS Tactical Action Officer Analysis 
Table 19 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for a TAO aboard an SSDS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 
Table 19. “To Be” SSDS TAO KVA Analysis 
 
c. AEGIS Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator 
Table 20 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for an AAWC aboard an AEGIS platform after reengineering with 
an open architecture approach. 
 
Table 20. “To Be” AEGIS AAWC KVA Analysis 
 
d. SSDS Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator 
Table 21 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for an AAWC aboard an SSDS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 





e. AEGIS Surface Warfare Coordinator 
Table 22 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for an SUWC aboard an AEGIS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 
Table 22. “To Be” AEGIS SUWC KVA Analysis 
 
f. SSDS Surface Warfare Coordinator 
Table 23 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for an SUWC aboard an SSDS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 
Table 23. “To Be” SSDS SUWC KVA Analysis 
 
g. AEGIS Combat Systems Coordinator 
Table 24 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for a CSC aboard an AEGIS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 
Table 24. “To Be” AEGIS CSC KVA Analysis 
 
h. SSDS Combat Systems Coordinator 
Table 25 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for a CSC aboard an SSDS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
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Table 25. “To Be” SSDS CSC KVA Analysis 
 
i. AEGIS Tactical Information Coordinator 
Table 26 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for a TIC aboard an AEGIS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 
Table 26. “To Be” AEGIS TIC KVA Analysis 
 
j. SSDS Tactical Information Coordinator 
Table 27 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for a TIC aboard an SSDS platform after reengineering with an open 
architecture approach. 
 
Table 27. “To Be” SSDS TIC KVA Analysis 
 
k. AEGIS Identification Supervisor 
Table 28 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for an IDS aboard an AEGIS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 








l. SSDS Identification Supervisor 
Table 29 depicts the notional track management core processes involved 
in the KVA analysis for an IDS aboard an SSDS platform after reengineering with an 
open architecture approach. 
 
Table 29. “To Be” SSDS IDS KVA Analysis 
 
G. WATCH STATION COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Now that both the “As Is” and “To Be” data have been presented, it is important 
to present the results in a side-by-side comparison.  Each of the watch stations are 
presented, with % of change in ROK bolded.  The “Correlate” and “Relay” processes 
were determined not to have any additional value added through an open architecture 
approach at this time.  Each watch station saw an increased ROK in the “Identify” 
process, and two had increases in the “Track” process as well.  Through an insertion of 
automation founded on an OA approach, and reduced “AWT”, it was apparent that OA 
could be used to increase the operational value of a situational awareness system. 
 




Table 31. AAWC Final Results 
 
 
Table 32. SUWC Final Results 
 
 




Table 34. TIC Final Results 
 
 
Table 35. IDS Final Results 
 
H. FINAL ROK RESULTS 
When combining the ROK for each watch station we can generate a complete 
picture of the return on knowledge capital invested for each process in both the “As Is” 
and “To Be” scenarios.  This representation better exemplifies the operational value that 
an OA framework can provide the Navy.  Differences in process ROK results across each 
platform are attributed to the difference in the amount of knowledge required for each of 
the platforms.   
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Table 36. “As Is” ROK Totals 
 
  
Table 37. “To Be” ROK Totals 
 
 
Table 38. ROK Change 
 
Table 38 depicts the dramatic effects that an OA approach can have on the 
“Track” and “Identify” processes.  The ROK indicated that after applying an OA 
approach efficiency with which knowledge assets are used within these processes 
dramatically increased. 
Knowledge is a key component in the efficient accomplishment of any mission, 
and therefore provides value to an operational environment.  The Department of the 
Navy, Chief Information Officers’ (DON CIO) Information Management/Information 
Technology (IM/IT) Strategic Plans’ stated goal to “build a knowledge sharing culture 
and exploit new IT tools to facilitate knowledge transfer across the globally distributed 
enterprise”, through “optimizing the effective application of intellectual capital to achieve 
organizational objectives” (DON CIO, 2001) provides another impetus to use knowledge 
as a surrogate for value in our core processes. 
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Increasing the performance of knowledge capital assets within a process provides 

















































Investments in information technology just for the sake of information technology 
have put the Navy in a precarious position.  Incompatibility, cost overruns and missed 
opportunities for the efficient use of new technology are often caused through antiquated 
government standards and application of proprietary approaches to systems design.  
Leveraging today’s technologies with an OA approach can help the Navy realize the full 
potential of its systems and processes.   
This thesis provided insight into the operational value that can be achieved by an 
OA approach through an increase in the performance of knowledge capital assets, such as 
situational awareness systems.  Through an application of KVA, the value of open 
architecture can be quantified and processes can be evaluated on a common basis.   
Through application of KVA, deficiencies and efficiencies can be seen and reengineering 
efforts can be tailored and prioritized to provide the greatest operational value to the war 
fighter by the most efficient and effective use of the OA approach. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The intent of this thesis was to answer the questions proposed in the first chapter.  
Through a decomposition of the track management process and subsequent analysis using 
the Knowledge Value Added methodology, the specifics of the questions can now be 
addressed. 
1. Can Open Architecture Improve the Operational Value in a 
Situational Awareness System? 
The underlying foundation of OA, if applied correctly, achieves attributes 
required for increasing the operational value of such systems.  Operational value is 
sometimes lost in the acquisitions of systems, due in large part to financial and schedule 
limitations that must be addressed.  While an OA approach has been proven in many 
cases to improve the acquisitions and maintenance cycles, little research is conducted on 
the operational value of the OA approach in information technology to support core 
processes.  The value of a system to an operator is one that can decrease work time 
(freeing the operator to conduct other functions); decreased time to learn the system 
(again, freeing the operator to conduct other tasks); and increase the processing power 
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while decreasing the processing time for each action (providing increased capability and 
efficiency).  This can, in turn, be achieved through proper management of knowledge 
assets within an organization’s core processes.     
Hardware that is consistent with the latest technological industry standards 
provides the greatest processing power with the least amount of latency.  Maintaining the 
ability to upgrade hardware when technology outpaces current systems, without a 
complete replacement of the system, provides the operator the greatest capability, thereby 
creating value.  In an environment that is not built on an OA foundation, hardware 
reaches its capacity and functionality limitations and cannot increase its capability 
through the leveraging of advanced technology.  Using COTS equipment, an OA 
approach can keep pace with technology and thus can maintain the decisive advantage 
the Navy has come to expect.     
Insertion of effective and efficient IT into core processes within a situational 
awareness process increases the operational value through a decrease in work time for the 
operator.  While proprietary systems can provide the IT resources that will lessen the 
work load on the operator, they are not flexible enough to integrate with new 
technologies as they become available.  An OA approach will facilitate seamless 
integration and can thus continue to decrease the work time for an operator when new 
technology becomes available.  The value is created through the continuous insertion of 
IT assets so that capacity limits in processing power are not expected.    
Lastly, the interoperability that is provided through open architecture facilitates 
faster, more effective transfer of information between sensors and users.  Integration of 
multiple sensors and data resources provides operators greater knowledge that will 
increase their situational awareness.  As IT systems are integrated into core processes, the 
value of the processes increases through more efficient use of resources.   
2. Can KVA be Applied to Current Track Management Systems? 
One of the concepts put forth by the DON CIO IM/IT Strategy is that “tacit 
knowledge is an example of an intellectual asset whose value is only realized when it is 
actually shared and reused effectively”, and that “an organization’s ability to innovate,  
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improve, and learn ties directly to that organization's value” (DON CIO, 2001).  A means 
to measure this concept will be fundamental in order to achieve organizational goals and 
missions in the Navy.   
A measurement of value for IT systems and core processes is extremely difficult 
to obtain for non-revenue generating organizations.  In such organizations, cost savings 
may be an important factor, but the true value of a system should be measured through its 
ability to produce outputs.  KVA can be a valuable tool for assessing the value of current 
and future track management systems.  The measurement of embedded, or tacit, 
knowledge in core processes is extremely useful when comparing systems.  Systems that 
are of equal capabilities, but require differing amounts of training time and work time can 
be analyzed and evaluated based on common units of output when using the KVA 
methodology.  Each of the core processes can be decomposed and analyzed as to how 
well they provide a return on knowledge.  Managers are not tied to financial metrics, but 
rather can justify systems and processes through a quantification of how productively a 
system or process uses its embedded knowledge.    
This methodology is robust and defensible and provides a means for true 
comparisons of naval systems.  The previous chapters provided a critical analysis of the 
track management systems within the Navy, and showed that KVA is a valuable tool for 
determining the value for these systems.   
3. Can ROK be Used to Determine Areas Where Open Architecture 
May Provide Increased Efficiency? 
Increased ROK does not, in and of itself, constitute improved operational value of 
a system developed using an OA approach.  Analysis of ROK, while important, only 
describes the relationship between inputs to output for each of the core process within a 
situational awareness system, and will not describe where future efficiencies or 
inefficiencies might be obtained through process reengineering.  Changes in ROK should 
be used as a means to identify processes that should be scrutinized for possible 
optimization of knowledge assets.  When ROK’s are derived from defensible KVA data, 
management is provided a tool to analyze performance metrics for knowledge capital 
assets within the organization, and can make more informed decisions on the application 
of knowledge assets. 
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4. Can Real Options Analysis be Used to Support Decisions Regarding 
Functional Integration of Current Platforms into Future Systems? 
The ROK results from the application of the KVA methodology to core processes 
provide the raw data that is used to determine operational options for systems design and 
implementation.  However, without the accompanying market comparables, it would 
prove insufficient from an acquisitions viewpoint, as the financial options would not be 
monetized.  When market comparables are integrated into the KVA analysis a more 
robust determination can be made regarding functional integration for future systems 
from both an operational and acquisitions perspective.  From a strictly operational 
standpoint, the most prevalent options are listed below: 
• Do nothing and allow the “As Is” processes to continue. 
• Create and apply middleware solutions to interface between systems built 
under an open architecture framework to legacy systems.  If successful, 
look to expand to all functional aspects of AEGIS and SSDS platforms. 
• Acquire COTS hardware to replace existing legacy components.  If 
successful, look to continue with COTS refresh on a scheduled basis. 
• Completely upgrade AEGIS and SSDS platforms to conform to OACE 
Category 4/5 compliance levels.  If successful, apply OA to all future 
situational awareness systems designs and implementations, and look to 
expand to other functional areas. 
B. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The data that was collected and analyzed for this thesis was provided by subject 
matter experts, both in the operational and training environment.  Each SME brings 
different experiences and levels of expertise to bear on their knowledge estimates 
provided for this research.  The data cannot be assumed perfect.  Until automated data 
capturing methods are in place, and historical data can be retrieved, assessed and 
analyzed, SME’s will continue to be the focal point of this type of analysis.   
The “To Be” analysis was based on situations that SME’s determined to be the 
best areas where open architecture could provide value to the operator.  While process 
reengineering ideas were constructed, the technical and legal aspects of the “To Be” 
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analysis were avoided in order to provide a conceptual idea rather than a practical one.  
Application of current legal parameters, technical constraints and budgetary limitations 


























This thesis explored the possibilities for using KVA as a methodology to measure 
the operational effectiveness of an open architecture approach to systems design.  
Looking at a notional reengineering effort founded on the principles of open architecture, 
as laid out by the PEO IWS, Open Architecture Division, there are definite advantages to 
be gained through open architecture and the use of KVA as a management tool.  
Changing the underlying way that systems are developed and implemented is a huge 
undertaking and will require a fundamental change in the way the Navy conducts 
business.  The Navy has begun the process of change through the creation of the OA 
Division in PEO IWS.  This first step was vital for the success of current and future naval 
systems in the area of interoperability and upgradeability, but additional research will be 
necessary to facilitate a seamless transition. 
A. RECOMMENDED CHANGE 
Realizing the value of an open architecture approach to systems design will 
require data capturing mechanisms that are not currently available.  The KVA analysis, 
and any other for that matter, is only as good as the data used for analysis.  For a 
complete analysis of OA, the following recommendations are provided: 
• Initiate efforts to include KVA analysis for core processes within 
situational awareness systems. 
• Define core processes and monitor the learning time and work time 
required to accomplish these processes.  As the data becomes more 
comprehensive, the results will better reflect actual processes as they are 
being conducted.  
• Create and update a repository of market comparables so that future 
financial analysis of KVA results can tap into a historical library of 
commercial sector functions that could match the process being analyzed. 
B. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
With the foundation being laid, there is still much research required in the area of 
measuring and determining the value of open architecture.  The acquisition community 
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could especially benefit from an open architecture approach to systems design, through 
software reuse, scalability and interoperability.  For this community to embrace the tenets 
and attributes of open architecture, further research is required. 
First, market comparables should be researched and applied to the results of any 
KVA analysis.  This thesis focused on the operational value of an open architecture, but 
to the acquisition community it is imperative to provide a surrogate for financial returns.  
Market comparables provides this through 1) a comparison of similar processes from the 
commercial sector; 2) comparing this process with the comparable non-profit or 
governmental process being analyzed; 3) determining the revenue associated with the 
commercial process; 4) applying the revenue estimates to the non-profit or governmental 
process to determine what price (revenue) the commercial sector is getting for similar 
process outputs.  This type of research will be vital for the continued movement of OA 
into the mainstream acquisition community due to the fact that KVA analysis can be 
monetized.  Having a means to see a financial impact on the design, operation and 
maintenance of an OA system could prove to be a key element of implementing OA 
throughout the Navy’s core processes. 
Second, an analysis on the maintainability of OA systems should be conducted.  
This area should prove to be the most important in the area of value when using an open 
architecture approach to systems design.  Through its ability to rapidly scale, upgrade and 
modify, a system founded on OA principles can have the potential to see huge savings in 
maintainability.  Providing an analysis in this area could provide an important rationale 
for the continued use of open architecture.  Providing a KVA and market comparables 
analysis on the maintainability of systems created through an OA framework is the next 
step in providing a well-rounded analysis of OA. 
Lastly, a KVA analysis of the entire AEGIS and SSDS systems could provide 
insight into areas that would not be fully realized through an analysis of only one 
component of the systems in a process.  This thesis examined the area of track 
management, but that is only one facet of the overall systems aboard naval vessels.  
Command and control, decision support, sensor inputs and a myriad of other components 
that comprise the overall systems on naval ships should be analyzed concurrently so that 
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possible benefits, which may have gone unnoticed when focusing on one component, can 
be realized.  When systems are examined through a complete analysis, interface and 
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